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Abstract 
This essay examines some properties of the Single Transferable Vote (Hare Voting) 
procedure for electing candidates in multi-member districts under the assumption that 
all voters are strategic. From the perspective of the most common criterion for evaluating 
voting procedures - the extent to which they ensure the eventual selection of Condorcet 
winning candidates - the results we offer in this essay can be interpreted as indictments 
of STY. Even if we restrict preferences by imposing conditions on attitudes towards risk 
and assume a strong form of separability, STY is not necessarily incentive compatible 
and strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of 
Condorcet outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of "bogus" 
equilibria - outcomes that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all 
circumstances even if we limit our analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria. 
Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters 
I. Introduction 
American politics are complicated by the necessity, under the winner-take-all format of single­
member districts, for drawing district boundaries to achieve "fair representation" in multi-ethnic and 
multi-racial polities. The conflicts that arise in this context and the opportunities for lawyers to 
profitably enter the debate are well known and make it reasonable to search for alternative election 
procedures. One such alternative is Hare voting or STY (the single transferable vote), which seeks 
to achieve fairness in the form of proportional representation without necessitating the construction 
of artificial district boundaries. 
Although used on occasion in local contexts, STY has not gained widespread acceptance, in part 
because it can be difficult to implement in large electorates without computer-aided tabulation 
technologies and because of the elitist view that electorates are not intellectually equipped to contend 
with STY's internal mechanics and lengthy ballots. There is, though, another reason for STY's 
minimal implementation -- the existence of examples in which STY exhibits some undesirable 
properties. Specifically, Daron and Kronick (1977) show that STY violates monotonicity -- that an 
increase in first place votes can disadvantage a candidate -- while Brams and Fishburn (1984) offer 
examples to illustrate that STY need not ensure the selection of a Condorcet winner. 
Monotonicity and a guarantee that Condorcet winners are selected are important criteria with 
which to evaluate any election procedure. Thus, existing research appears to provide a powerful 
argument against STY's use or for preferring it over other procedures a priori. But the arguments
offered by this research are less than compelling since they fail to consider the possibility that voters 
might act strategically so as to ensure the selection of Condorcet winners. In this essay, then, we 
explore some of the properties of Hare voting when voters are strategic. We should state at the outset, 
however, that, owing to STY's strategic complexity, our formal results are limited to some special 
cases and counter-examples. Nevertheless, our results allow us to formulate informed conjectures 
about STY's properties. 
2. STY and some Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some essential notation and with a description of STY in terms of a 5-
step algorithm. Letting n be the number of ballots (voters in this analysis since we assume that all
enfranchised citizens vote), ni be the number of voters with type j preferences, and C ={a, b. c, ... )
be the set of candidates, suppose m < k candidates are to be elected or, equivalently, that k candidates
compete to fill m seats. Then, following Hoag and Hallett's description ( 1926), our algorithm is,
i. Each voter, j =I, 2, .. ., n, begins with voting weight w; =I; 
11. Each voter j casts a ballot Bj that ranks the k candidates from first to last;
111. Letting 
n 
w
= 
:E O·W· 
I • I J J 1= 
where Si = I if j's ballot currently ranks .. candidate i first, and equals 0 otherwise. Then
candidate i is elected if 
Wi?:Q = lt [ -n- ] + Im+I 
where It denotes "the integer portion of."
iv. There are now two possibilities: (I) If Wi < q for all candidates, strike from the ballots the 
names of those candidates who receive no first place votes. Then delete from the ballot the 
candidate with the fewest first-place votes. In the event of ties, use a fair lottery to eliminate
candidates. (If the number of candidates surviving at any stage equals the number of seats
to be filled, then those candidates are elected.) Return to step iii. (2) If Wi?: q for at least one
candidate, then elect all such candidates and delete their names from all ballots, and proceed
to step v.
v. If candidate ci is elected, then after deleting ci from all ballots, set
W; = (Wj - q)/H
for all ballots that had ranked ci first, where H is the number of such ballots. Return to step
iii unless all committee positions are filled. 
To see the source of our concern over STV's ability to select Condorcet winners if such a winner 
exists, suppose k = 4, C = (a.b.c.d) and suppose an electorate of 99 voters is evenly divided across the
three preference orders as shown in Example I. 
33 33 33 
a b c 
d d d 
b c a 
c a b 
example I 
2 
If m = 3, then q = It[99/4] + I = 25 and application of the preceding algorithm to these preferences
produces the outcome (a,b,c) even though d is the Condorcet winner. 
Of course, this example does not establish the superiority of other procedures. If the alternative 
to STY is three single-member districts, and if each of the above preference orders corresponds to 
a district, then each district will unanimously elect a candidate other than d. Thus, whether an overall 
Condorcet winner is elected in a single member district system can depend on how district boundaries 
are drawn. 
It is unclear, then, whether the failure to choose the Condorcet candidate is always "a bad thing," 
since we are hard pressed to identify a "better" outcome than (a,b,c). Consider, though, Example 2 
in which, if m = 3, so that q = 25, the STY outcome is (a,b,e) even though d is the Condorcet
winner.1 In this instance, however, there is no apparent reason to prefer {a,b,e) over {a,b,d). Thus,
unlike Example I, Example 2 yields an outcome, (a,b,e), that seems dominated normatively by
another, (a,b,d). 
38 37 24 
a b c 
e d d 
d e e 
b c a
c a b
Example 5 
The problem with such examples, though, is the presumption that voting is sincere. Merely 
applying a procedure to some fixed set of preferences assumes that voters cast ballots consistent with 
those preferences, whereas Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) establish that if there are three
or more outcomes, then there must exist at least one preference profile -- possibly the one under 
consideration as an example -- such that uniform sincerity is not an equilibrium. The question, then, 
1 Note that a and b are immediately elected with 13 and 12 excess votes respectively, which then
gives 13 votes toe, 12 to d, and 24 to c. Since no candidate meets the quota, the candidate with the 
fewest votes, d, is eliminated, thereby electing e with 25 first-place votes.
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is whether counter-examples to STY meeting one criterion or another can be sustained as equilibrium 
outcomes when the electorate is allowed to be strategic. 
However, before we can address this matter, we must contend with the fact that we do not yet 
have a well-defined notion of sincere versus insincere voting since ballots and outcomes are not 
described in the same way under STY. A ballot, Bi, is a ranking (complete or partial) of the elements
of C.2 Thus, if we assume that voters have well-defined preferences over the set of candidates C,
we can differentiate between sincere and insincere ballots. But to be correct in our analysis of 
incentives, we should assume instead that preferences are well-defined over outcomes, which in this 
instance are sets of elected candidates. That is, if Cm denotes the set of all subsets of C of size m, 
then C E Cm is an outcome, but knowing a voter's preferences over C does not necessarily tell us
anything about that person's preferences over Cm -- although a voter might prefer a to b to c if
forced to choose a single candidate, it is nevertheless possible that this voter prefers the combination 
{b.c) to {a.b). Put differently, knowing preferences over Cm does not tell us which ballots ought to 
be labeled sincere and which ought to be labeled insincere. 
A route out of our problem is to assume that preferences are defined over C -- thereby allowing
a "clean" definition of sincere voting -- but to suppose also that there are restrictions on preferences 
over the elements of Cm. Specifically, letting P denote strict preference (throughout this essay we
simplify matters by assuming that all preferences are strict), consider the following restriction: 
RI: If C-{c) = C'-(c'), where c, c' EC and C, C' E Cm, then C PC' iff c Pc'.
For example, if m = 2 and k = 3, then {a,b) P {a,c) P {b,c), if and only if a Pb Pc. Notice that if m 
= k- l ,  R l completely constrains the relationship between preferences over Cm and those over C, 
whereas if l < m < k-l, some latitude remains in this relationship. For example, if a Pb Pc Pd, then
(b,c) P {a,d) and {a,d) P {b,c) are both allowed. 
If we allow all preference profiles over C, then with or without RI, all preference profiles over 
Cm are admissible and it would appear that Gibbard and Satterthwaite's result applies to establish that 
insincere voting cannot be precluded a priori. But we have not yet considered a second complicating 
factor, namely that the set of outcomes also includes lotteries over Cm. If a final outcome corresponds
to a tie between two or more candidates and if ties are broken by impartial devices such as coin tosses, 
then the actual domain of outcomes includes the lotteries over Cm that such devices allow. Thus, we 
2 We assume that all voters cast complete ballots. Brams and Fishburn (1977) show that outcomes
may be sensitive to truncation, and this fact ought to be considered in any extension of our analysis. 
4 
ought to ask whether there are any restrictions over preferences for such lotteries in the form of 
attitudes towards risk that negate the imperatives of any general manipulability result. 
The answer to this question is that in general there is no such restriction, but it is nevertheless 
useful to consider one restriction in particular, because it facilitates the distinction among alternative 
cases later. That restriction is: 
R2: A voter is said to be risk averse if the next-to-last-preferred outcome is preferred to an 
equi-probable lottery over Ckci· That is, letting c_i = C - {c;), and letting the subscript i
denote a candidate's rank in the voter's preference order, then that voter is said to be risk 
averse if 
1 
k 
-k :!: u(C_1)::;u(C_2)
i=l 
We emphasize that R2 is severe. For example, if preferences are separable -- if 
u(C) = u(c1) + ... + u(c,_1) + u(c,,1) + •.. + u(c;J 
then R2 requires that 
k 
u(c1) .e:u(c2) + :!: [u(c,)-u(c)J
j=3 
which requires that the utility difference between a voter's first and second ranked candidates 
"overwhelms" the combined differences between the second ranked candidate and all remaining 
candidates. 
Throughout the remainder of this essay, we restrict our formal analysis -- but not our examples -
- to the special case of m = k-1 = 2. We understand that such a restriction does not allow for a
general analysis, but this narrow domain is nevertheless sufficient for our purposes -- our results are 
largely negative and there is no reason to suppose that STY's properties improve as larger values of 
k and m are considered. That is, if STY has complex and undesirable properties when m = k - 1 = 
2, we should assume that those properties pervade all STY systems. 
3. Sincerity as a Nash Equilibrium
We proceed now by noting that the usual analyses of STY take one of two approaches. First, it
is shown that applying STY to some fixed set of preferences (ostensibly, sincere preferences) produces 
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one type of outcome or another (c.f., Merrill 1984, Doron and Kronick 1977). Alternatively, after 
postulating preferences and determining the outcome that prevails under sincerity, it is shown how 
defections from sincerity to insincerity can change the outcome to the benefit of those who defect 
(c.f. Fishburn and Brams 19xx). Thus, if voters are allowed to be strategic, the first approach yields 
valid interpretations of STV's potential consequences only if sincerity is a Nash equilibrium. The 
second approach is valid only if the defections considered are the only ones that will be made by 
strategic voters -- only if the new assumed strategies are an equilibrium. What we propose, then, is 
to explore the circumstances under which these implicit assumptions are valid. 
We turn first to the issue of determining the circumstances under which sincerity is a Nash 
equilibrium. Let Vi denote the number of voters who most prefer candidate i, let Viih denote the
number of voters who prefer i to j to h, and let Wi be defined as before. Then Result 1 (which we 
prove in the appendix), establishes that while there can be circumstances under which sincerity is a 
Nash equilibrium, there are also circumstances in even a very limited context under which it cannot 
be an equilibrium: 
Result 1: If m = k-1 = 2 and
I. if R2 is satisfied, then a voter who prefers i P j Ph will defect from the strategy n­
tuple "everyone votes sincerely" if and only if Vi> q, and Vi, Vh < q for the remaining
two candidates, with 
(!) 
where 6 2: -I depends on i's excess votes and the portion of these votes transferred to
}; 
2. if R2 is not satisfied. the set of preferences that do not allow sincerity to be a Nash
equilibrium expands to include those situations in which Vi = q and Vi, Vh < q.
One unsurprising implication of Result 1 is that there exists ordinal preferences such that "all 
voters vote sincerely" is not a Nash equilibrium. In Example 3, with m = 2 and q = 34, if any voter
who most prefers a to b to c defects unilaterally from sincerity, the outcome is (a,b) rather than a 
lottery between (a,b) and (a,c}. 
6 
1 g 1 g 32 32 
a a c b 
b c a c 
c b b a 
Example 3 
On the other hand, Result t also tells us that there is a wide range of circumstances under which
"all voters vote sincerely" is a Nash equilibrium and it suggests where we might look for such 
equilibria in situations other than k 
= 
3. For instance, in Example l ,  because all candidates but d 
exceed the quota, no individual has any incentive to defect from sincerity. Thus, the election of 
(a,b,c) is an equilibrium. To see, moreover, that the existence of sincere equilibria does not depend 
on the inability of individual voters to be pivotal, suppose we try to elect d in Example 1 by having
8 voters from each of the three preference types reverse the order of their first and second-ranked 
candidates on their ballots. This switch produces Example 4. Clearly, candidates a, b and c continue
to be elected under this ballot profile. Now consider whether a voter who holds the first preference 
prefers to cast an insincere ballot. If this voter switches the position of a and d, d is elected, but a 
is eliminated, thereby producing the outcome (b,c,d) -- the voter's least preferred outcome -­
whereas moving b and c to the top position produces the same outcome. Thus, none of the twenty 
four voters who switched from sincere to insincere ballots by ranking d first can gain, and indeed, 
there are circumstances under which they are hurt by doing so. Moreover, the insincere ballots of 
these twenty four voters, although they render all other voters pivotal, do not create a situation in 
which any of these other voters prefers to be insincere. Thus, voting sincerely is an equilibrium even 
though the Condorcet winner is not elected.
25 25 25 g 8 8 
a b c d d d
d d d a b c
b c a b c a
c a b c a b
Example 4 
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In summary, then: Sincere voting can be a Nash equilibrium in STV systems even if the equilibrium 
outcome fails to elect a Condorcet winning candidate; and this fact does not depend on examples in 
which no voter is pivotal or in which voters fail to eliminate (weakly) dominated strategies. 
4. Insincerity and Condorcet Winners
As our summary statement indicates, we are not interested in sincere versus insincere voting for
its own sake. Rather, our interest derives from the desire to gain some sense of the circumstances 
under which STV systems are likely to elect Condorcet winners in the event that such winners exist. 
But Result I also leads us to conjecture that as the number of candidates increases beyond 3, the
incentives for insincerity will expand. Even if strong assumptions such as R2 are satisfied, as k 
grows, the opportunities for making or breaking ties among those candidates not elected on the first 
ballot will increase, and it is precisely these opportunities that induce voters to cast insincere ballots. 
This fact, then, raises a new question. Specifically, if voters find it in their interest to vote 
insincerely, will such voting ensure the election of Condorcet winning candidates? 
Unfortunately, Example 5 reveals that the answer to this question is no -- indeed, strategic voting 
can lead away from the selection of a Condorcet winner. 
18 17 32 32 
a a( c) c b 
b c( a) b a 
c b(b) a c 
Example 5 
Ignoring the preferences in parentheses, if everyone votes sincerely, a is elected because its vote, 35, 
exceeds the quota of 34 -- at which point b is elected because its share of a's excess vote exceeds e's 
share, thereby breaking the tie between c and b in favor of b. So the Condorcet winner, b, is elected 
in a sincere ballot. Now, however, consider the incentives to be strategic. Some simple algebra 
establishes that expression(!) in Result 1 is satisfied only for voters who prefer a to c to b, so only 
they have an incentive to defect from sincere voting. In particular, if any such voter casts a ballot 
that ranks c first, a is elected again but has no excess votes to transfer to b, in which case b is 
eliminated and c is elected. Moreover, if R2 is satisfied, Result 1 tells us that this new ballot profile 
with a single insincere voter is an equilibrium. 
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5. Strong Equilibria and Condorcet Winners
Thus far we have seen that sincere voting can be an equilibrium that fails to elect Condorcet 
winners, and that insincere voting need not elect such winners, even in equilibrium. What we have 
not considered, though, is the possibility that other variations of the definition of equilibrium can 
cause us to modify our conclusions about STV's empirical properties. 
To see the problem more clearly, consider Example 6a in which, if m = 1 (so that q = 51) and if
everyone is sincere, the outcome (b} prevails even though c is the Condorcet winner, whereas if we
allow voters to be .strategic, c is elected:3 Now. consider Example 6b, which adds candidates to 
Example 6a so that sincere voting continues to select b but unilateral adjustments in rankings and 
deletions of dominated strategies do not lead to the selection of the Condorcet winner, c. Asserting
that b is the inevitable final outcome, though, is problematical. First, notice that if all voters of the 
first type rank e above a, then e is elected. But now if all voters of the second type respond by
ranking c first, then c is elected. Of course, this reasoning is reminiscent of the "he-thinks" regress
that notions of non-cooperative equilibria are designed to resolve. The particular difficulty here, 
though, is that no individual voter is decisive for the outcome and, therefore, there is no guarantee 
that that reasoning will proceed in such a way as to lead to one type of equilibrium rather than 
another. In other words, we may become "trapped" in one type of equilibrium merely because no 
single voter can have any influence on the outcome. 
40 40 20 40 40 20 
a b c a b d 
c c b e c c 
b a a c a e 
b d b 
d e a 
Example 6a Example 6b 
3 Because it is never advantageous to rank one's least preferred candidate first or second, voters
of the first type know that even with strategic voting, candidate a can never be elected. Thus, each 
such voter should rank c first so as to elect c rather than b. That is, all "a-voters" insincerely ranking
c first on their ballots, and everyone else voting sincerely" is an equilibrium.
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Such examples, then, illustrate a general problem with STY. On the one hand, a great many 
equilibria are supported by the fact that no individual voter has a positive incentive to alter its 
strategy. On the other hand, these equilibria cannot be eliminated using refinements like trembling 
hand perfection or elimination of weakly dominated strategies, because there is always at least one 
circumstance in which the strategy in question is strictly preferred to all others. 
We suspect, nevertheless, that such equilibria are unreasonable predictions or that they provide 
something less than a firm basis for evaluating election procedures. First, although each voter knows 
that he or she is unlikely to be pivotal, each voter also knows that its vote is irrelevant unless it is 
pivotal. Thus, one alternative is to restrict ourselves to examining equilibria in which at least one 
voter is pivotal. We call such equilibria individually stable. 
Second, we know that considerable effort is directed in multi-candidate election campaigns at 
coordinating the actions of voters. Labor unions, newspapers, and the candidates attempt to educate 
voters about strategic complexities, especially when it is in their interest to do so, by telling them, for 
instance, how not to "waste their vote" or how voting for one candidate merely works to the advantage 
of some undesirable alternative. Thus, it seems reasonable to pay special heed to those equilibria that 
cannot be upset even if voters can successfully coordinate their actions. There are several ways to 
approach this second consideration. Myerson (19xx), for instance, introduces the notion of proper 
equilibria to handle precisely this type of problem; but STV's complexity leaves us perplexed as to 
how to apply this idea. Hence, we turn instead to Aumann's (1957) notion of a strong equilibrium -
- a Nash equilibrium that is stable against the coordinated defections of any set of voters. 
To see the problems we encounter now with ensuring the selection of a Condorcet winning 
candidate, consider the following fact: 
Remark 1: Even if C contains a Condorcet winning candidate and even if preferences satisfy
RI. it is not necessarily the case that Cm contains a Condorcet winning outcome.
Suppose individual preferences establish d as the Condorcet winner, but suppose that they also 
generate a cycle among candidates a, b, and c. Then if m = 2, the outcomes {a,d), {b,d), and {c,d} 
form a top-cycle in Cm, whereas if m = 3, then {d,a,b), {d,a,c), and {d,b,c) cycle. This is not to say,
though, that we cannot induce Condorcet outcomes with appropriate preferences over candidates. 
For example, 
Remark 2: If preferences over Care single-peaked, then under RI, Cm contains a Condorcet
winning outcome. 
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If preferences over C are single peaked, then preferences over Care transitive under simple majority 
rule. If this transitive order is, say, I P 2 P 3, and so on, then the Condorcet outcome in Cm is
(1,2, ... ,m).4 
The question, now, is whether the notions of individually stable and strong equilibria can 
rationalize the selection of a Condorcet winning outcome when such an outcome exists. The following 
two preliminary results, which we state without proof owing to their limited applicability, suggest that 
the answer to this question is yes: 
Result 2: If m = 1, then in any strong or individually stable equilibrium, the Condorcet winner 
is elected if such a winner exists. 
Result 3: If m = 2 and k = 3, if ni 2: q for at most one candidate, if R2 is not satisfied, then
sincere voting is an individually stable or a strong equilibrium only if a Condorcet winner, 
whenever it exists, is either elected with certainty or with some non-zero probability. 
Unfortunately, a single counter-example, Example 7, dashes all hope of extending these results:
34 
b 
a 
c 
d 
32 
c 
a 
b 
d 
11 
d 
a 
c 
b 
Example 7 
11 
d 
c 
a 
b 
10 
d 
b 
a 
c 
Given these preferences, candidate a is the Condorcet winner and, for m = 2, {a,c) is a Condorcet 
outcome -- a defeats b, c and d; and c defeats both b and d. However, sincere voting yields the 
4 Notice, however, that RI is not sufficiently restrictive to allow us to assert that preferences
over Cm are transitive even if preferences over Care single peaked. For example, if C = {1,2, ... ,12)
and m = 4, then we cannot infer anything about the social preference relation among the outcomes 
{ l ,2,11,12), (3,4,9,10), and (5,6,7,8) . . 
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outcome {b,c) -- candidate b is elected, after which a is eliminated because it has only b 's one excess 
vote; this vote is then given to c and c is elected. 
Our interest in this example, though, derives from the fact that sincere voting is the unique strong 
equilibrium. To see this, notice that there are only three alternative outcomes, {a,c), {a,b), and {b,d), 
and we can consider whether any of these outcomes can be realized by coordinated action. 
{a,c): Preference types 2, 3, and 4, with a total of 54 votes, prefer {a,c) to {b,c). None of 
these voters, though, can abortthe selection of b, and thus they can merely substitute 
the outcome {a,b) for {b,c). 
{a,b): Preference types 1, 3, and 5, with 55 votes, prefer {a,b) to {b,c). Type 1 voters have 
no incentive to change, even if they coordinate somehow with types 3 and 5, since any 
change merely elects a rather than b on the first round. If types 3 and 5 rank a first,
so that it is not eliminated after b is elected, c gets 32 votes, a 23, and d 11, at which 
point d is eliminated and c is elected (having gained 11 votes from the type 4 voters, 
who have no incentive to coordinate so as to elect candidate b over c). 
{b,d): Only voters with type 3, 4 and 5 preferences prefer {b,d} to {b,c), but since they are
already ranking d first and are not instrumental in the eventual selection of c (recall 
that c is elected by the type 1 voters after a is eliminated from consideration), they
cannot together change the outcome. 
Thus, no subset of voters has any incentive or means to coordinate so as bring about an outcome other 
than {b,c) -- {b,c) corresponds to the unique strong equilibrium. 
6. Conclusion
From the perspective of some common criteria for evaluating voting procedures, the results we 
offer in this essay will almost certainly be interpreted as indictments of STY. Even if we restrict 
preferences with conditions RI and R2, STY is not necessarily incentive compatible. Moreover, 
strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of Condorcet 
outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of "bogus" equilibria -- outcomes 
that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all circumstances even if we limit our 
analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria. 
It is not the case, though, that the Condorcet criterion is the unique or even the most important 
criterion with which to evaluate election procedures. For example, we have not examined the extent 
to which STY ensures proportionality and we have not compared STY to other procedures. Despite 
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the apparent deficiencies described in this essay, STY may yet prove to be a viable alternative to 
systems that seek to ensure proportionality by other means. 
Appendix: Proof of Result 1 
The proof of Result 1 makes use of three lemmas. Our first lemma, though, can be stated without
proof, because it concerns the situation in which Hare voting corresponds to a simple 2-candidate 
contest. 
Second, 
Finally, 
Lemma 1: If m = I and k = 2, then voting sincerely is (weakly) dominant.
Lemma 2: If W; < q for all i, then W1 = W2 = ... = W0 = q - 1.5
Lemma 3: If W; = q for only one i and Wj < q for all j.;. i, then either Wh = q-2 for one h.;. i
and Wi = q-1 for all j.;. i,h or Wi = q-1 for all j.;. i.6
Turning to the proof of Result 1, suppose B = (B1, B2, ... , B0} is any configuration of sincere ballots,
and consider any voter, j. What we want to establish is the incentives for this voter to deviate from 
sincerity. Let C = (a,b,c}, and to simplify matters, assuming, without loss of generality, that this voter 
holds the preference a P b  P c. We have four cases: 
5 If the preconditions of the lemma hold, then W; s. q - 1 for all i. If for any i, Wi < q, summing
up votes across the candidates gives E Wi < kq - k. However, despite the truncation required by It in
the definition of q, we must have kq - 3 s. E W;. and these two inequalities cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. So equality must hold originally -- that is, W; = q - 1 for all i, which is a k-way tie.
6 Suppose to the contrary that Wh < q-2 or Wh s. q-2 for more than one h. Then
k 
which is impossible. 
E W; :O q + (q-3) + (k -2)(q-l ) 
i=I 
= kq - k - 1 = k[n/k] -1 < n
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Case 1: W; < q for all candidates. From Lemma 2, the outcome is a 3-way tie, in which case sincere
voting yields an equi-probable lottery over (a,b), {a,c), and (b,c). If the voter insincerely votes b P
a Pc, candidate b is elected with certainty but has no excess votes to transfer to a. Candidate a now 
has one fewer first-place votes than c, so the switch causes (b,c) to prevail -- the voter's least 
preferred outcome. 
Case 2: W; > q for one candidate. In this instance there are two subcases:
i. w. > q: The voter cannot affect the election of a. However, if it votes sincerely, b and
e's respective voting weights subsequently are 
W + Wbc (W. -q)b a W a
W + Web (Wa -q)c a W a
Clearly, the voter in question can be decisive for b versus c only if the difference in 
these weights is less than or equal to 0 but not so small as to preclude the voter from
at least creating a tie between b and c. By voting insincerely, the voter increases b's 
vote by 1, less the decreased transfer of a's excess. Candidate b's net gain, then, is 
So 
1 - w:c[I - ..i..] + (W:c - l)[l - q ]w. w. -1 
_q_ 
w.-1 
w,!< -q[-­w -I a 
w,!< - -]w. 
Notice now that if n is sufficiently large so that q/(W.-1) is approximately equal to
q/W., then
5 - _ _<J_
w. 
so if the value of expression (1) falls in the interval [5,0], then the voter votes
insincerely. 
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11. Wb (WJ > q: The voter cannot affect the election of b (c), and it cannot improve a's
chances by any insincere ballot.
Case 3: W; = q for only one candidate. There are three subcases:
i. W• = q. From Lemmas 3, either W b = w. = q-1, in which case a sincere ballot yields
an equi-probable lottery between {a,b) and {a,c} and an insincere one yields a lottery 
between {a,b) and {b,c} -- and the voter prefer the first lottery to the second. 
Alternatively, if, from Lemma 3, We= q-1 and Wb = q-2, then ranking b first yields
an equi-probable lottery over all three possible outcomes. And by R2, the voter 
prefer the certainty of {a,c} to this lottery. 
11. Wb = q. Switching to bac merely gives b one more vote and makes the eventual
selection of a less likely. 
iii. w. = q. Switching to bac can at best elect {b,c}, whereas voting sincerely can yield
{a,c). 
Case 4: W; � q for two candidates. We should assume that equality holds for at least one candidate
since if inequality holds no individual voter can influence the outcome and voter j in particular has 
no incentive to deviate from a sincere strategy. So we have three subcases: 
1. The two candidates are a and b, in which case the voter has no incentive to change its 
vote since (a,b) is the voter's most preferred outcome. 
11. The two candidates are a and c. If W a= q, then switching to a ballot that orders the
candidates bac can only elect b along with c -- the voter's least preferred outcome. If 
w. = q and w. > q, then Wb < q-1 and switching to bac cannot change the outcome.
11i. The two candidates are b and c. A sincere ballot cannot elect a, so neither can an 
insincere one. 
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